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HOW THE CORPORATION CONQUERED 
JOHN BULL 
A. W. Brian Simpson* 
INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 1720-1844. By Ron Harris. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2000. Pp. xvi, 331. Cloth, $60. 
This is a study of the evolution of the forms of business organiza­
tion during the industrial revolution. Historians never fully agree 
about anything at all, and often with good reason, but there is really 
no doubt that the period covered by this book is one that saw major 
changes in agricultural and industrial production, and in commercial 
practice and organization. It is convenient to refer broadly to the 
changes which took place in terms of a revolution, industrial, agricul­
tural, or less commonly, commercial in nature. 
Long before the starting date for this study, which is the date of the 
Bubble Act of 1720, there had existed firms of one kind or another, 
which had engaged in production, commerce, and consumption. The 
oldest form taken by the firm is the family. There existed in medieval 
and early modern England numerous other important legally recog­
nized associations or collectivities, such as households, guilds, colleges, 
universities, Inns of Court and Inns of Chancery, convents, cities, bor­
oughs and charitable foundations, such as hospitals. The typical form 
of association employed for business purposes was the partnership. 
But in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the insti­
tution of the corporation, which was conceived to possess a personality 
distinct from that of its members, and which had evolved outside the 
commercial world, came to be employed for business purposes. 
In the same period the Court of Chancery invented the conception 
of the trust, an institution to some degree modeled on the earlier me­
dieval institution of the use. In origin quite unconnected with the 
commercial world, the trust could, potentially, be adapted for use in 
the commercial field, though this development was not to take place 
until the eighteenth century. 
The main emphasis of Ron Harris's Industrializing English Law: 
Entrepreneurship and Business Organization 1720-18441 is on the 
* Charles and Edith Clyne Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1954, M.A. 
1958, D.C.L. 1976, Oxford. - Ed. 
1. Ron Harris is a Senior Lecturer of Legal History at the Tel Aviv University School of 
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forms of commercial group organization, some incorporated, some 
not, which were available to the business community after 1720, in 
particular during the industrial revolution. Harris provides a full chap­
ter devoted to the pre-1720 business corporation, which was mainly 
associated with overseas trade and monopoly. Two distinct forms of 
business corporation evolved - the regulated corporation and the 
joint stock corporation. In the case of the regulated corporation, un­
like the joint stock corporation, members of the company traded with 
their individual stock, and the company provided the infrastructure 
necessary to make the venture successful. It was possible for incorpo­
ration to depend upon prescription, but business corporations mainly 
came into existence by way of grant or concession from the state, op­
erating either through a Crown charter or the issue of letters patent 
under the prerogative, or through an Act of Parliament to which the 
Crown assented. There existed no right to incorporation; incorpora­
tion came about as a consequence of negotiations between entrepre­
neurs and the Crown, and was a privilege. Most business activity was 
conducted by individual entrepreneurs or by entrepreneurs operating 
in partnership, not through business corporations. 
At the end of the day, the winner was, of course, the joint stock 
corporation with limited liability. It supplanted the partnership as the 
typical form of business organization, differing from the partnership, 
in earlier times the dominant form, by possessing independent legal 
personality, transferable assets, limited liability, and an internal hier­
archical management structure. Associated with the rise of the joint 
stock corporation was the evolution of organized markets in which 
stock could be traded, along with government bonds. A school of 
thought attributes the triumph of such corporations over the partner­
ship to their superior efficiency. As Harris points out (p. 22 n.19), this 
conception of efficiency is somewhat differently analyzed by lawyers, 
by economists, and by law and economics scholars, but all those who 
rely on the concept of efficiency as the basic tool of explanation pres­
ent the modern corporate form as being "of phenomenal importance 
for the rise of modern industrial capitalism" (p. 23). It is thought to 
possess as dramatic an importance in Western history as "the discov­
ery of America or the invention of the steam engine" (p. 23). So if you 
want to know how the West grew rich, and think it has something to 
do with the institutions of the law, study the invention of the modern 
corporate form of business organization. 
Those devoted to universalizing the explanatory power of effi­
ciency tend to present the historical process as driven by a sort of in­
evitability; other forms of business organization, which lose out in the 
process, resemble giraffes with medium-length necks, doomed, if they 
ever existed at all, not to make even cameo appearances on the 
Discovery Channel or amongst the wildebeest on the Serengeti Plains. 
Harris is an economic historian, and historians are by disposition un-
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easy with historical inevitability. He also sets out to give an account of 
triumph of the joint stock corporation by combining insights derived 
from general historical writings, from the writings of economists and 
economic historians, and from legal historians. He has no inclination 
to write winners' history, but rather to explain a complicated process 
of evolution over time. He suspects that a belief in the driving force of 
efficiency, which for some odd reason triumphs only in the nineteenth 
century, though presumably it was around since the beginnings of 
time, does little by itself to illuminate a complicated story. At the same 
time he has no wish to neglect the importance of the concept, and is by 
no means uninterested, as many historians have been, in general theo­
retical explanations of historical change. 
So his book opens with a valuable analysis of the literature that 
addresses the relationship, if there is one, between legal and economic 
development. Harris argues that, in the main, this literature adopts, to 
a greater or less degree, one of two contrasting paradigms or, in Max 
Weber's terms, relates explanation to two contrasting ideal types. Ac­
cording to one paradigm, the law and the legal system are viewed as 
relatively autonomous. Legal change, when it occurs, is managed by an 
elite group of professional lawyers, and in particular by the tiny cote­
rie of judges. It is driven by the internal logic of the law, and is rela­
tively unaffected by economic and social forces external to the law. An 
example of a body of law which, at least in its detailed ramifications, 
might seem obviously to fit this paradigm would be the bizarre "Rule 
in Shelley's Case."2 According to this paradigm: 
[T]he Bubble Act, the common law, and legal hostility to the share mar­
ket played significant parts in hindering the development of the joint­
stock company for more than a century. After the passage of the Bubble 
Act, unincorporated joint stock companies were declared illegal by 
judges and their formation was harshly punished. Incorporation by the 
State was an expensive and complicated matter, granted only in excep­
tional cases. The legal framework was unresponsive to economic needs 
and delayed the progress of joint stock companies in England until well 
into the nineteenth century. (p. 4; footnotes omitted) 
The ramifications of conceiving of the law in this way are various: for 
example, the legal elite is portrayed as isolated from commercial soci­
ety, and ill-informed as to its needs and of the practice of the business 
community. Economic development is presented as coming about in 
spite of the law, or even, on occasions, outside the law entirely. There 
are indeed familiar examples of business practices that have evolved 
2. Though, as I have argued elsewhere, that is only part of the story. See A.W.B. 
SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 13-44 (1995) [hereinafter LEADING 
CASES IN THE COMMON LAW]. 
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outside the common law; an example would be the early futures mar­
kets.3 
According to an opposing paradigm, the law and the legal system 
are not viewed as autonomous, but rather as being reactive to external 
pressures and needs. When legal evolution was required by the busi­
ness community, it swiftly occurred: "The law responded functionally 
to the economy and placed no restraints on growth during the indus­
trial revolution" (pp. 5-6). 
The law, according to this view, is not autonomous, but rather 
functional. The basic plausibility in this approach is obvious enough. 
After all, it was in England that the industrial revolution took place; 
by the mid-nineteenth century Britain had become the workshop of 
the world, and the first modern superpower. If an autonomous legal 
system, as postulated by the first paradigm, operated as a drag on de­
velopment, how could such dramatic development have ever oc­
curred? 
A third possibility that Harris mentions but does not develop much 
at a theoretical level involves a compromise position (p. 7). According 
to this, the formal law is presented as indeed being autonomous, but 
the business community and their lawyers manipulated it, or even by­
passed it entirely, so as to serve their needs. Law, according to this 
paradigm, is at the same time both autonomous and functional, but 
functional only because it is infinitely malleable. More radically, it 
could even be argued that according to this paradigm the forms of law, 
or at least of large areas of law, are simply irrelevant to economic de­
velopment. Whatever the state of the law, the needs of the business 
community, or any other powerful social group, will be served. This 
way of looking at the matter is not unlike the claim, advanced by some 
writers wedded to the conception of economic efficiency, that efficient 
legal rules and institutions will drive out inefficient ones. The differ­
ence is that the claim is not so much that rules and institutions will 
change, but that they will be, in effect, distorted. 
Harris's own position starts from the position that neither the 
autonomous paradigm, nor the functional paradigm can, by itself, sat­
isfactorily explain the developments in the law of business organiza­
tion in his period. The empirical evidence is incompatible with an 
analysis which fails to appreciate that law is both autonomous and 
functional or, to put it another way, that the autonomous character of 
law is in continuous tension with its functional character. So his aim is 
"to demonstrate the advantages of abandoning the poles and moving 
towards the center" (p. 8). Hence his interpretation "does not offer a 
simple and coherent thesis, as this cannot be supported by the com­
plex nature of the interaction" (pp. 8-9). 
3. See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, The Origins of Futures Trading in the Liverpool Cotton 
Market, in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 179 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 199 1). 
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In addition, Harris emphasizes, as do most empirical historians, the 
importance of "in economists' jargon path dependency, exogenous 
shocks, and contingency. Many historians have, in fact, been aware of 
such factors for quite a while, though without theorizing about them 
or giving them fancy labels" (p. 11). A book whose starting point is the 
Bubble Act of 1720 is bound to pay attention to exogenous shocks, for 
the passage of this Act took place at the time of the collapse of the 
share market known as the South Sea Bubble, and all serious histori­
ans attach some significance to contingency and happenstance. The 
conception of path dependency is employed throughout the study in 
the contention that where legal institutions end up is often condi­
tioned by the position from which they began, or, as the point is put in 
one passage by "the historical burden" (p. 40). In reading Harris's in­
troductory theoretical discussion I could not but be reminded of those 
brief passages in which Oliver Wendell Holmes set out, in epigram­
matic form, his limited but seminal ideas on the nature of law and le­
gal development, ideas which he was, sadly, unable to either develop 
or use himself. In his claim that the life of the law has not been logic, 
but experience,4 he put his faith in the functional paradigm. But in the 
following passage he argued that: "The substance of the law at any 
given time pretty nearly corresponds, as far as it goes, with what it 
then understood to be convenient; but its form, and the degree to 
which it is able to work out desired results, depends very much upon 
its past. "5 
Harris, in his account of the evolution of business organization, 
emphasizes the importance of a factor not to be found in Holmes, 
which is the process which produces legal change. For a theme which 
runs through this book is that the legal situation of groups of entre­
preneurs was, in this period, the product of conflict and negotiation 
between rival interest groups, mediated through a political process 
rather than a process of adjudication. In a sense, therefore, what is in­
volved in this study is not so much the relationship between law and 
legal change and economic development, but between the political 
process and legal development. 
In order to make his account of the developments after 1720 intel­
ligible, Harris gives a brief account of group organizations as they ex­
isted in the late medieval and early modern period. In the sixteenth 
century, the corporation, which was not originally associated with the 
world of commerce, was adapted for commercial use, and Harris pro­
vides a full chapter devoted to the pre-1720 business corporation, 
which was mainly associated with the establishment of monopolies de­
voted to overseas trade. Incorporation could come about only through 
4. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Har­
vard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). 
5. Id. at 6. 
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a Royal grant under the prerogative powers of the Crown, or through 
a legislative ad hoc Act of Parliament; there was no general legislation 
permitting groups of entrepreneurs to achieve incorporation so long as 
they satisfied conditions specified by general law and went through 
some formal process of registration. By the early eighteenth century, 
there existed a relatively small number of joint stock business corpora­
tions, such as the Hudson Bay Company, the South Sea Company, and 
the Bank of England, which had been formally incorporated. There 
had also evolved an active share market, dealing in the stock both of 
incorporated business companies, and of companies that had not been 
formally incorporated. A scheme was promoted whereby the South 
Sea Company was to take over the national debt, with government 
bonds converted into stock in the South Sea Company. The scheme 
ended in disaster with a catastrophic collapse of the market. The 
Bubble Act of 1720 made it a criminal offence for any undertaking to 
purport to act as a corporate body in raising or transferring stock un­
less it had been authorized by Royal Charter or Act of Parliament,6 
and was at one time generally explained as a reaction to the collapse 
of the South Sea Bubble. Harris, however, thinks this is incorrect. The 
Bubble Act was, in fact, promoted by the South Sea Company itself 
before the crash. But the context in which the Act was passed associ­
ated it with a suspicious and hostile attitude to operations by unincor­
porated companies, whose promotion was associated with fraud and 
the encouragement of wild and hazardous schemes, an attitude that 
long persisted, and that was combined with hostility to those who dealt 
in shares of such companies. But for a long time, the provisions in the 
Act which adopted a punitive attitude to unincorporated joint stock 
companies with transferable stock were a dead letter, and the criminal 
provision in the Act was only once invoked in this period. 
In the period following the Bubble Act there was an important 
change in practice. The Crown adopted a restrictive policy toward the 
grant of new charters of incorporation. This left entrepreneurs with 
two alternative strategies. One was to employ forms of business asso­
ciation that did not involved incorporation. The other was to promote 
Acts of Parliament, known as Local and Personal Acts, under which 
they could enjoy the advantages of incorporation. This mechanism for 
incorporation depended for its validity upon the sovereign powers of 
Parliament, which could enact not only general legislation, but also 
particular legislation relating to a single person, as in the case of di­
vorce Acts, or relating to a particular scheme of industrial or agricul­
tural development. 
So far as the first possibility is concerned, Harris gives a detailed 
account of the forms of unincorporated association which were on of-
6. The Bubble Act, 1720, 6 Geo., c. 18 (Eng.). 
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fer: in addition to family ownership and partnerships there were possi­
bilities in the trust, employed in schemes of road improvement, for ex­
ample, in the turnpike trusts, and outside the world of the common 
law there existed the system of ship ownership under the Court of 
Admiralty, and the system of cost book accounting operated by min­
ing companies governed by the stannary law of the hard rock mining 
world, which was predominantly located in Cornwall. Given some in­
genuity, entrepreneurs could operate as unincorporated companies, 
relying upon schemes that made use of normal contract law, of part­
nership law, and the trust. 
In Part II of his book, Harris explores the relationship between 
economic and commercial development in particular fields and the 
forms of organization employed. Why was it that in the eighteenth 
century, after the invention of the joint stock corporation, forms of 
unincorporated business organization continued to be employed in 
some sectors of the economy, for example in insurance and in highway 
improvement, but not in others, such as in some other sectors of the 
transport industry, in particular the building of canals and the im­
provement of navigable rivers? Why the divergence? Why indeed did 
it take so long for the joint stock corporation, once invented, to 
achieve a dominant position? Was it that it was not in reality of supe­
rior efficiency? Or was it that the conditions in which it did possess su­
perior efficiency simply did not exist in the eighteenth century? Or 
was it that there existed costs or other entry barriers associated with 
incorporation which were sufficiently serious to persuade entrepre­
neurs that it was preferable for them to operate through unincorpo­
rated forms? 
Harris argues that the joint stock corporation as a form of organi­
zation had significant advantages over unincorporated forms, and that, 
at least in some sectors of the economy, the conditions in which it was 
superior existed in the period under consideration. But with the de­
clining use of the Royal prerogative power to grant corporate status by 
charter, entrepreneurs had to rely upon private Acts of Parliament 
and this had the consequence of subjecting incorporation to political 
control. It was not the costs of promoting an Act that served as the 
impediment, for these were relatively modest, but rather the fact that 
the procedures involved gave an opportunity for rival interest groups 
to combine in an attempt to block the scheme. Thus, for example, ex­
isting insurance corporations, operating within a nationwide market, 
had an incentive to prevent a new group of entrepreneurs joining the 
club by securing a private act, and were able, by exploiting the politi­
cal character of the parliamentary procedures, to make it extremely 
difficult for such an act to be obtained. But since no nationwide corpo­
ration engaging in river improvement existed, a group of entrepre­
neurs who promoted a new scheme for a particular river was not likely 
to encounter the same sort of opposition from vested interests. This 
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explains the divergence between the forms of organization typically 
used in these two sectors of the economy. There were numerous pri­
vate acts for river improvement, but few in the world of insurance. 
Harris does not rely solely on this explanation for divergences in 
the use of the corporate form. There were other explanatory factors 
involved; where production was organized in relatively small units op­
erating in particular localities, the continuous interrelation between 
actors might encourage personal trust, thus making the advantages of 
the corporate form less important. In the course of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, Parliament did not establish any clearly 
settled or general principles to guide itself in granting or refusing to 
grant incorporation by private act: "[N]o clear policy or general crite­
ria existed for incorporation during much of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century [sic]. Incorporation was granted or refused on the 
basis of the level of opposition of conflicting vested interests" (p. 136). 
But if there was no body of settled criteria, there were trends, and 
there was an important development, which was the outcome of politi­
cal processes rather than of autonomous legal evolution. This was the 
progressive curtailment of the association between incorporation and 
monopoly - a target for the political economists. By 1833, when the 
Bank of England's monopoly in the issuing of notes was curtailed, this 
association had largely disappeared, so that a characteristic generally 
shared by approved schemes of incorporation was that they were not 
schemes involving the grant of legal monopoly powers. The joint stock 
corporation had become a mechanism for facilitating competition in a 
free market; in origin it had been a mechanism for the establishment 
of trading monopolies. Its economic function had been transformed. 
Harris's general explanation is convincingly argued, but gives rise 
to a puzzle - why did the use of incorporation by charter under the 
prerogative decline in the eighteenth century? The process is an aspect 
of the steady rise in the conventional power of Parliament at the ex­
pense of the Crown, and the explanation for this essentially constitu­
tional development largely lies outside the scope of this book. From a 
positive point of view, Harris's analysis of the evidence is part of a lit­
erature that emphasizes the central importance of the private bill as an 
instrument of economic development during the agricultural and in­
dustrial revolution.7 There is a considerable body of writing on the his­
tory and functioning of private bill procedure; we still lack a general 
study. 
In the early nineteenth century, the Bubble Act, whose somewhat 
obscure provisions had long lain dormant, was revived, and by now it 
was the received wisdom that the Bubble Act had been a reaction to 
7. See LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 2 18-20. Important recent 
books of relevance are J. GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 
(2000), and R. w. KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITALISM 1825-1875 (1994). 
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the ill deeds of promoters of fraudulent schemes, operating unlawfully 
perhaps even at common law. So the legality of unincorporated busi­
ness companies became an issue in the courts. Harris attributes this 
revival to the rapid expansion in the number of unincorporated com­
panies promoted in the late eighteenth century, and to the lack of sta­
bility in the market for shares that characterized the period. It became 
clear that the provisions of the Bubble Act were alive and well, and 
that at least some unincorporated companies were illegal. There was a 
speculative boom from 1824-1825, and in 1825 the Court of King's 
Bench held, in the case of Josephs v. Peber,8 that the Equitable Loan 
Bank Company, which had opened its books for the sale of shares 
without waiting for incorporation under a private act, was illegal, so 
that a contract for the purchase of its shares was void. In Kinder v. 
Taylor,9 (also 1825) the Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, expressed the 
view that the unincorporated Del Monte Company might well be ille­
gal not only under the Bubble Act, but also at common law. During 
this period, the judges and the legal system they controlled swam 
against the commercial tide in the name of paternalism. The law, pre­
sented as an autonomous body of doctrine protective both of the royal 
prerogative and the unwary investor, appeared unresponsive to well­
established business practice and to economic and commercial needs. 
Parliament responded by repealing the Bubble Act in 1825. The mem­
ber of Parliament who introduced the first Bill for the repeal of the 
Act, Peter Moore, stated in the Commons: 
At present the law in respect to these companies was very obscure and 
ill-understood .... The necessity of settling a question of so much impor­
tance was placed beyond question, by the amount of capital which was 
daily investing in these speculations, and which [it] would be safe in esti­
mating at upwards of 160 millions.10 
Moore, as Harris shows, was himself much involved as an entrepre­
neur in the speculations of the period, and had a vested interest in the 
repeal of the Act, which was in any event brought about by a Bill 
promoted by the Attorney General John Copley11 on behalf of the 
government of the day. Copley thought that the correct strategy was 
to relieve Parliament of the burden of controlling grants of incorpora­
tion through private bill procedure, and to revive the practice of rely­
ing on Crown Charters. Applications for charters would be monitored, 
under the supervision of the Law Officers. Under such a system incor­
poration retained the character of a privilege; entrepreneurs were not 
to enjoy a right to incorporation. 
8. 3 B. & C. 639 ( 1825). 
9. L.J. O.S. Vol. III, Cases in Chancery 68. 
10. P. 262 (citations omitted) (quoting 12 HANSFORD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 
1279). 
1 1. Later Lord Lyndhurst. 
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One of the characteristics of the modern joint stock corporation is 
the enjoyment of limited liability. In the case of partnerships, the lim­
ited partnership was only accepted in 1907;12 the common law, unlike 
the legal systems of continental Europe did not recognize such an in­
stitution. There were, however, ways of providing for sleeping part­
ners - one being to conceptualize them as lenders to the active part­
ners, entitled to a share in the profits only in the form of interest on 
the loan, which might generate problems over the usury laws that lim­
ited interest rates. Another was to keep their identity a secret except 
to the active partners (pp. 29-31). The result was that the limited part­
nership did not play a significant role in business, though in the nature 
of things it may be difficult to know how much of a role it did play. 
The history of the association between incorporation and limited li­
ability is both obscure and controversial, and Harris argues that the 
partial explanation for this "lies in the confused and inconsistent defi­
nition of limited liability by both contemporaries and historians" 
(p. 128). 
Three different kinds of debt might be involved - debts of share­
holders to the corporation, those of shareholders to third parties, and 
those of the corporation to third parties - and a number of different 
issues could arise and be separately answered. For example: 
Could shareholders, as such, be arrested for debts ... and could they, al­
ternatively or in addition, be liable to bankruptcy laws as far as debts 
were concerned? ... Were shareholders liable for corporate debt only 
upon dissolution, or as soon as the unpaid debts were claimed? ... Were 
shareholders liable only up to the sum of their paid-up capital? Could 
calls also be made for the unpaid balance of the shares they held in order 
to cover debts? (pp. 128-29) 
In the course of the eighteenth century some of these issues were an­
swered, so that for example ownership of shares in a business corpora­
tion did not turn a shareholder into a trader liable to bankruptcy pro­
ceedings. Occasionally, some aspect of limited liability was attached to 
a corporation under the terms of a private act, though Harris is not 
able to say how common this was. No doubt the matter deserves fur­
ther investigation. But the general impression conveyed by the sources 
is that limitation of liability may not have seemed so important to 
early eighteenth century entrepreneurs as one might expect. One fac­
tor that operates today - the fear of extensive liability in tort law -
hardly operated at all in this period. By the end of the eighteenth cen­
tury, however, entrepreneurs, whether seeking incorporation by Royal 
charter or by Act of Parliament, regarded limited liability in one form 
or another as essential to success (p. 130). Harris does not really ex­
plain why this change came about, though he does note the cruel char-
12. By The Limited Partnership Act. 
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acter of contemporary law relating to debtors and bankrupts. By the 
early nineteenth century it came to be settled that limited liability at­
tached automatically to corporations created by Royal charter, and it 
became common where incorporation was by private act to include a 
clause providing for it, though again Harris does not provide much in 
the way of detail as to the form of such clauses or their frequency. The 
whole subject needs further investigation, both to establish a narrative 
and to examine the significance of limited liability for economic de­
velopment, since it seems that its recognition was not a prerequisite to 
the industrial revolution. 
At the end of the period covered by this book, Parliamentary con­
trol over incorporation through private bill procedure was to be sup­
planted by the system of registration. Under this system, Parliament 
laid down the conditions under which any group of entrepreneurs 
could establish a business corporation not by negotiation with the 
Crown, and not through an essentially political process through pri­
vate bill procedure, but by registration. Through registration they be­
came subject to a scheme of regulation intended to provide members 
of the public with information which, it was supposed, would enable 
them to distinguish reliable companies from unreliable ones. In the 
concluding chapter of his book, Harris traces the steps by which this 
new approach to company formation came to be embodied in the 
Companies Act of 1844. It can be seen as part of a wider development, 
whereby a system under which the Parliamentary process was used to 
authorize or refuse authorization to particular entrepreneurial 
schemes, whether they were schemes for enclosures, for building 
docks, for constructing canals, or whatever, through a form of conflict 
resolution - each scheme being handled in isolation, was replaced by 
a system where Parliament settled on some general scheme of regula­
tion that all entrepreneurs had access to and could be changed by sub­
sequent general legislation based on experience. This change was part 
of a process that significantly altered the function of Parliament from a 
body primarily concerned with privately promoted legislation to one 
concerned with general legislation promoted by political parties. 
Harris's study of the history of the forms of business association is 
an important one, written by an author with a mastery of a large body 
of literature, and always related to empirical evidence though con­
tinuously informed by a concern with theoretical issues. It is clearly 
written, and it is something of an achievement to have covered so wide 
a subject in a book of modest length. Like all good books it does not 
impose closure, but raises and suggests further lines of enquiry. It is a 
fine book that deserves a wide readership. 
